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DISABILITY, DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS: 






Persons with disabilities are subject to unique forms of deprivation of liberty, often 
justified by reference to the need to protect their right to life, right to health, and to 
protect the human rights of others. This paper examines disability-specific forms of 
deprivation of liberty, particularly those authorised in mental health and capacity law, 
in light of their compliance with European and international human rights frameworks. 
It explores the apparent tension between Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which permits deprivation of liberty of ‘persons of unsound mind’ in 
certain circumstances, and Article 14 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, which states that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify 
a deprivation of liberty.’ The challenges in attempting to comply with both provisions 
are illustrated through reference to developments in England and Wales. This paper 
also seeks to offer a way forward for States Parties to both Conventions, in order to 




This paper seeks to address the perceived conflict in the framing of the right to liberty 
in both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In particular, my analysis will focus on 
Article 5 ECHR and Article 14 CRPD, with reference to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the standpoint of the UN Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities in General Comment 1 and its Guidance on Article 14. I 
explore the argument that depriving persons with disabilities of their liberty is 
necessary to protect their right to life (and to a lesser extent their right to health), and 
critique this from the standpoint of the CRPD. While the main focus of this paper is on 
the relevant international standards, I will briefly illustrate their application to domestic 
law in England and Wales, particularly the Mental Health Act, Mental Capacity Act, the 
Law Commission’s reform proposals and relevant domestic and ECHR case law on 
the perceived conflict between the right to life and the right to liberty. Finally, I will set 
out some recommendations for reconciling the perceived conflict in international 
standards on the right to liberty in domestic and European legal frameworks, in a 
manner which I believe best respects the human rights of persons with disabilities. 
 
II. ARTICLE 5(1)(e) ECHR – 
 DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY FOR ‘PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND’ 
 
This article sets out the right to liberty under the Convention, stating that: “Everyone 
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” 
An exception is provided for “the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the 
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spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants.”1  
 
Bearing in mind that the Convention was adopted in 1950 and came into force in 1953, 
its language and approach must be placed in the context of its time. While the legal 
position on deprivation of liberty for these populations in many States Parties to the 
ECHR has evolved since the treaty text was adopted, the Convention has not kept 
pace with these developments, nor with the new expressions of the right to liberty in 
international human rights law, particularly as set out in the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. However, before considering the position of the ECHR in 
light of new developments in international human rights law, it is worth setting out 
briefly the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 5 
as it applies to persons with disabilities. 
 
The European Court has justified the deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind 
on the basis that they may be a danger to public safety2 but also that should be 
detained in their own ‘best interests’ to provide them with medical treatment3 (usually 
non-consensual treatment). In Winterwerp v The Netherlands, the court clarified that 
‘unsound mind’ means that on the basis of ‘objective medical evidence’ the person 
must be found to have ‘a true mental disorder … of a kind or degree warranting 
compulsory confinement.’4 States are given a wide margin of appreciation by the court 
to determine who is a person of unsound mind,5 and the majority of the case law on 
this provision focuses on people labelled with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities. 
The court’s jurisprudence is heavily reliant on medical evidence of impairment and as 
a justification for the necessity of detention, and in general, placement in a medical 
setting or an institution with medical supervision is required by the court where Article 
5(1)(e) is engaged.6 While the court emphasises that such evidence must be 
‘objective’ it has not, to date, significantly challenged the perceived objectivity of such 
evidence, considering this to form part of the margin of appreciation accorded to states 
in implementing the Convention.7  
 
Persons with disabilities face many different kinds of deprivation of liberty including 
detention by police, imprisonment, involuntary confinement in hospitals, psychiatric 
institutions and social care homes. In determining whether a person was deprived of 
liberty, the European Court will examine whether the individual was free to leave the 
restricted area, the degree of supervision and control over the person’s movements, 
the extent of isolation or segregation from others and contact with the broader 
community, as well as the absence of consent to this confinement.8 In terms of what 
the Court considers ‘valid’ consent, the case law has held where a person who is 
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‘incompetent’ to give consent, the fact that he or she did not object to the deprivation 
of liberty should not be regarded as equivalent to consent.9 The nature of confinement 
as well as the absence of the person’s consent, are two significant issues for persons 
with disabilities – especially those with significant and complex intellectual and 
psychosocial disabilities – which has generated significant commentary in English 
case law and subsequent literature, as will be explored further below. 
 
The aim of Article 5 is to ensure that no one is deprived of liberty in an arbitrary manner. 
In order to guarantee that a deprivation of liberty is not arbitrary, it must be undertaken 
in a manner that is prescribed in national law, and be compliant with the provisions of 
the ECHR.10 With regard to the deprivation of liberty of persons of ‘unsound mind’, the 
Court has found that various instances of detention were ‘arbitrary’ if they were 
undertaken with no formal authority, or were not subject to judicial scrutiny.11 Bartlett 
has further noted that while Article 5 seeks to defend against arbitrary detention, the 
practice of domestic bodies in many Council of Europe member states in authorising 
detention on the basis of disability often amounts to simply rubber-stamping the 
original decisions made by clinicians and social services, and he calls on the court to 
give clearer guidelines on the robust safeguards required to deter these practices.12 
 
However, the Court has not yet considered whether the designation of an individual 
as a person of ‘unsound mind’ is itself an arbitrary construct. First, the term ‘unsound 
mind’ is relatively imprecise which could lead to arbitrariness. Second, even if 
‘unsound mind’ is interpreted more strictly and linked to a diagnosis of disability or 
mental illness, the attribution of these labels to individuals have also been shown to 
be subject to wide socio-cultural variation.13 For example, Kirk and Kutchins’ seminal 
study14 on the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses showed that “the ranges of reliability 
for major diagnostic categories were found to be very broad, and in some cases 
ranged the entire spectrum from chance to perfect agreement, with the case summary 
studies (in which clinicians are given detailed written case histories and asked to make 
diagnoses – an approach that most closely approximates what happens in clinical 
practice) producing the lowest reliability levels.”15 This research demonstrates the 
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14 Stuart A. Kirk and Herb Kutchins, ‘The myth of the reliability of DSM’ (1994) 15(1) Journal of Mind 
and Behavior 71. 
15 Sami Timimi, ‘No More Psychiatric Labels: Campaign to Abolish Psychiatric Diagnostic Systems such 
as ICD and DSM (CAPSID)’ (2013) 40(4) Self & Society 6 at 8. 
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potentially arbitrary manner in which diagnostic categories for mental illness are 
applied. 
 
The case law of the Court on the definition of ‘unsound mind’ also references 
underlying concepts of risk of harm to self or others. Determining when a risk of harm 
is present is also highly subjective and a potentially arbitrary construct.16 As Simons 
and many other scholars have noted, “[n]o evidence-based research supports the 
proposition that clinicians can accurately predict when, or even if, an individual will 
commit an act of violence toward oneself or others.”17 To date the Court has not 
addressed these questions about the arbitrariness of designating an individual to be 
of ‘unsound mind’ – however, as will be discussed further below, there is a trend in 
more recent interpretations of international human rights law to consider detention on 
the basis of disability to be a form of arbitrary detention, and this is likely to be a matter 
the court will soon confront in its own jurisprudence. 
 
While there have been advances in the Court’s case law on liberty in broadening the 
scope of locations in which it recognises a deprivation of liberty can occur,18 and the 
recognition that a person’s acquiescence to a deprivation of liberty does not 
necessarily constitute valid consent19 a number of significant challenges remain. First, 
the Court’s case law has not yet addressed whether people with disabilities can be 
deprived of liberty in their own homes or private residences, although domestic case 
law in England20 has determined that such forms of deprivation of liberty do breach 
Article 5 rights. Second, the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 5 generally focuses on 
whether the correct procedures prescribed in national law have been followed, rather 
than examining the substantive issue of whether the deprivation of liberty is justified 
on its merits. The main findings of violations of Article 5 for persons with disabilities to 
date, including Stanev, have therefore been based on procedural irregularities at the 
national level. As a result, the Court has found relatively few violations of Article 5 in 
cases of involuntary detention and treatment of persons with psychosocial disabilities. 
 
The Court is of course restricted in its scope here by the wording of Article 5 which 
includes reference to a ‘procedure prescribed by law’ and by the wide margin of 
appreciation accorded to States to determine whether a deprivation of liberty is 
necessary in an individual case. For these reasons, since the Court’s jurisprudence 
has not yet addressed the core question of whether disability-specific deprivations of 
liberty are in themselves human rights violations, I will not analyse in further detail the 
significant body of ECHR case law on Article 5. However, there are possibilities even 
within the narrow scope of Article 5 for increasing findings of violations under the 
ECHR – particularly where proportionality tests are used to demonstrate that less 
restrictive alternatives to detention should be used in order to pursue the State’s 
legitimate aim of protecting the totality of the individual’s human rights (including the 
                                                          
16 Joanna Moncrieff, ‘“Freedom is more important than health”: Thomas Szasz and the problem of 
paternalism’ (2014) 11(2) International Psychiatry 46 at 47. 
17 Robert I. Simon, ‘The Myth of Imminent Violence in Psychiatry and the Law’ (2006) 75 University of 
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right to health and the right to life). I will explore this idea further below where I 
reference the alternatives to detention and forced treatment which are gaining 
recognition since the entry into force of the CRPD.  
 
In short, the Court’s position on the deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind 
has been to accept it as necessary (and not a de facto human rights violation), to 
tightly control such measures and review the resulting deprivation of liberty to 
determine its ongoing necessity. This differs significantly from the most recent 
expression of the right to liberty and security in international human rights law, Article 
14 CRPD. However, it is important to state here that the ECHR is permissive towards 
this kind of deprivation of liberty, rather than requiring all States to guarantee that they 
will in fact deprive persons of unsound mind of their liberty. This may seem like an 
obvious point, but it is worth restating. In efforts to reconcile State obligations under 
European and international human rights law, some commentators, especially those 
who have incorporated the ECHR into their domestic law, have argued that the ECHR 
requires the deprivation of liberty of certain persons with disabilities.21 This is simply 
incorrect. While Article 5 allows for deprivations of liberty for this population it certainly 
does not require it. Neither does it require deprivations of liberty for ‘drug addicts and 
vagrants’, and indeed, in most States Parties to the Convention, it is no longer 
permissible to detain individuals just by labelling them an addict or a vagrant. 
Therefore, a State Party which has ratified the ECHR may be perfectly compliant with 
Article 5 if it does not permit the deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind who 
are perceived to be a danger to themselves or others. 
 
This misconception must be addressed in any effort to reconcile the perceived tension 
between the ECHR and other international instruments such as the CRPD. While it is 
of course true that the ECHR permits disability-specific deprivations of liberty, whereas 
the CRPD does not,22 it is still important to remember that a State can comply with 
both treaties by having a regime that does not permit any disability-specific 
deprivations of liberty. Further, many Council of Europe states have ratified both the 
ECHR and the CRPD. Most of these states take a monist approach to international 
law so that the CRPD automatically becomes part of domestic law following 
ratification. Article 5 requires that legislative frameworks on deprivation of liberty 
‘comply with national law’ – and where national law includes the CRPD following 
ratification or incorporation, this can be used as a justification for states to abolish 
disability-specific forms of deprivation of liberty in a manner consistent with Article 14 
CRPD. 
 
However, the UK has a dualist system, which means of course that the CRPD is not 
justiciable in domestic courts unless it is incorporated in domestic law, which has not 
occurred to date. This must be contrasted with the UK position on the ECHR, which 
has been incorporated in domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998, and can 
                                                          
21 See for example, Law Centre Northern Ireland, Submission to the Ad Hoc Joint Committee on the 
Mental Capacity Bill (Belfast, 2015), available at: 
<http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/ad-hoc-mental-capacity-bill/written-
submissions/law-centre-ni.pdf> (last accessed 12 January 2016). 
22 See Philip William Hugh Fennell and Urfan Khaliq, ‘Conflicting or complementary obligations? The 
UN Disability Rights Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and English law’ (2011) 
6 European Human Rights Law Review 662 and Peter Bartlett, ‘A mental disorder of a kind or degree 
warranting compulsory confinement: examining justifications for psychiatric detention’ (2012) 16(6) 
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be directly argued through the domestic courts. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting 
that the UK, upon ratification of the CRPD, did not enter any declarations or 
reservations concerning deprivation of liberty and involuntary treatment under Articles 
12, 14 or 25. The UK ratified in 2009, at which point the position of the CRPD 
Committee on Article 14 and its implied prohibition on all disability-specific forms of 
deprivation of liberty had been made clear through a number of Concluding 
Observations,23 as had the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights’ interpretation 
to the same effect.24 Therefore, the UK Government should have been aware of the 
meaning of Article 14, and its failure to enter reservations or interpretative declarations 
on this matter can be taken as an indication of its intent to comply fully with the 
requirements of this article. 
 
Even without explicit legislative incorporation, domestic courts in the UK have already 
referred to the CRPD in 73 cases involving persons with disabilities as a persuasive 
authority in international law.25 In two of these cases Article 14 CRPD has been used 
by domestic UK courts to inform their interpretation of the rights conferred by the 
ECHR. In AH v West London Mental Health Trust, the Upper Tribunal interpreted s 
12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 in a way that was 
consistent with the right in Article 6 of the ECHR (to a fair trial) “re-enforced by article 
13 of the CRPD”.26 The result was that a person deprived of their liberty under the 
Mental Health Act “should have the same or substantially equivalent right of access to 
a public hearing as a non-disabled person who has been deprived of his or her 
liberty”.27  
 
A similar issue was raised in the series of cases starting with Re X – in which the Court 
of Protection28 and the Court of Appeal29 grappled with the question of whether an 
individual, who is the subject of an application for the deprivation of his/her liberty, 
should be made a party to the relevant Court of Protection proceedings. Ultimately, in 
a subsequent decision, Mr Justice Charles interpreted the procedural requirements of 
Articles 13 and 14 of the CRPD as to require independent representation – which he 
felt could, in the majority of cases, be provided by members of the person’s family.30 
Therefore, he found that the CRPD would require the relevant person to be joined as 
a party to the proceedings only when there was no other way to guarantee their 
independent representation in court. While these cases only dealt with procedural 
                                                          
23 See for example Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the 
Convention: Concluding Observations, Tunisia, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), 5th Sess., at 4, UN Doc CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (11–15 April 2011); Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention: Concluding Observations, Spain, 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 6th Sess, at 5, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (19–23 September 2011). 
24 See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at 
[48]. 
25 For further analysis of these judgments, see Anna Lawson and Lucy Series, ‘The United Kingdom’ in 
Anna Lawson and Lisa Waddington (eds) Interpreting and Domesticating the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Courts (Oxford University 
Press, 2017) forthcoming. 
26 [2011] UKUT 74 (AAC) at 22 per Carnwath LJ. 
27 Ibid. 
28 X & Ors (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014] EWCOP 25 and Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) 
(Number 2) [2014] EWCOP 37. 
29 Re X (Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599. 
30 NRA & Others [2015] EWCOP 59 at para 158. 
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issues and did not address the core content of Article 14 CRPD, they open the door 
for further consideration of the framing of this right in the CRPD in domestic case law 
on deprivation of liberty. 
 
Some scholars, such as Minkowitz,31 have further argued that even where the CRPD 
does not form part of national law, its content should supersede prior treaties (such as 
the Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults) addressing disability-
specific issues, including the rights to liberty and security. This argument is based on 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention which sets out rules for reconciling ‘successive 
treaties relating to the same subject-matter.’ However, the Vienna Convention’s 
primary focus is on the relationship between states parties who have ratified the same 
treaties, rather than on the obligations a state has to its citizens in implementing its 
international obligations in domestic law. Nevertheless, the principle it establishes is 
an important one, and as the CRPD represents the most recent expression of how the 
right to liberty should be applied to persons with disabilities, as well as a text which 
was negotiated with significant involvement of persons with disabilities,32 I believe that 
states would do well to regard this interpretation as the best means to ensure equal 
application of universal human rights in the specific context of disability. 
 
III. ARTICLE 14 CRPD –  
PROHIBITING DISABILITY-SPECIFIC DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY 
 
Article 14(1)(b) CRPD requires States Parties to ensure “that the existence of a 
disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.” This wording was initially put 
forward by the Working Group which developed the first draft of the Convention text. 
During the negotiation of the CRPD, States and civil society debated whether this 
provision should be framed to ensure that disability could not be the sole or exclusive 
basis for a deprivation of liberty. Canada, Australia, Uganda, China and New Zealand 
suggested adding the term ‘solely based on disability’ and the EU favoured the term 
‘exclusively based on disability’ to this provision. Such an approach would have meant 
that the existence of a disability combined with the risk of harm to self or others could 
justify a deprivation of liberty. Many states, including Mexico and South Africa33 and 
civil society organisations, including the International Disability Caucus and the World 
Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry34 strongly opposed the proposal to 
include the term ‘solely’ or ‘exclusively’ in Article 14, and as a result, the final wording 
is as above.  
 
This wording, and the fact that other options were considered and ultimately rejected, 
means that Article 14 must be read to prohibit all deprivations of liberty where the 
existence of disability is a factor in justifying the detention. Although there are scholars 
who disagree with this interpretation,35 and some who have argued that an 
                                                          
31 Tina Minkowitz, ‘Comments on CRPD and Hague Convention on the International Protection of 
Adults’, available at <www.chrusp.org> (last accessed 12 January 2016). 
32 Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1. 
33 Ad Hoc Committee, Third Session, Daily summary of discussions, May 26, 2004; Fifth Session, Daily 
summary of discussions, January 26, 2005. 
34 Ad Hoc Committee, Fifth Session, Daily summary of discussions, January 26, 2005. 
35 See for example Melvyn Colin Freeman et al, ‘Reversing hard-won victories in the name of human 
rights: a critique of the General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ (2015) 2(9) Lancet Psychiatry 844; John Dawson, ‘A realistic approach to assessing 
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assessment of decision-making capability can serve as the basis for detention if it is 
undertaken in a disability-neutral manner,36 the majority of the literature published 
since the Convention entered into force has acknowledged that Article 14 represents 
a prohibition on forms of detention where disability is one of the grounds for the 
deprivation of liberty.37 From the time the CRPD was adopted, this is the interpretation 
favoured by scholars who were actively involved in the negotiations,38 as well as the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,39 and the UN Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,40 the treaty body responsible for monitoring the 
Convention. In all dialogues which the Committee has undertaken to date with States 
Parties, it has urged States to repeal existing laws which provide for preventative 
detention on the basis of disability, including laws which permit institutionalisation and 
forced treatment. For example, in the Committee’s concluding observations on 
Australia, it recommended as a matter of urgency that the State “review its laws that 
allow for the deprivation of liberty on the basis of disability, including psychosocial or 
intellectual disabilities, repeal provisions that authorize involuntary internment linked 
to an apparent or diagnosed disability.”41  
 
The right to liberty and to be free from forced medical interventions in Article 14 is 
closely connected to the right to legal capacity in Article 12. In the Committee’s 
General Comment on Article 12, it described the relationship between the two articles 
as follows: “The denial of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities and their 
detention in institutions against their will, either without their consent or with the 
consent of a substitute decision-maker, is an ongoing problem. This practice 
                                                          
mental health laws’ compliance with the UNCRPD’ (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 70. 
36 See George Szmukler, Rowena Daw, and Felicity Callard, ‘Mental health law and the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2014) 37(3) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 245. 
37 See for example Bernadette McSherry, ‘International trends in mental health laws: Introduction’ 
(2008) 26(2) Law in Context 1; Annegret Kampf, ‘The Disabilities Convention and its consequences for 
mental health laws in Australia’ (2008) 26(2) Law in Context 10; Anna Nilsson, ‘Objective and 
Reasonable? Scrutinising Compulsory Mental Health Interventions from a Non-discrimination 
Perspective’ (2014) 14(3) Human Rights Law Review 459; Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the future of mental health law’ (2009) 8(12) 
Psychiatry 496; Tina Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and the right to be free from nonconsensual psychiatric interventions’ (2007) 34(2) Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce 405; Arlene S. Kanter, The Development of Disability 
Rights under International Law: From Charity to Human Rights (Routledge, 2014); Anna Nilsson, 
‘Objective and Reasonable? Scrutinising Compulsory Mental Health Interventions from a Non-
discrimination Perspective’ (2014) 14(3) Human Rights Law Review 459. 
38 See Tina Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
the right to be free from nonconsensual psychiatric interventions’ (2007) 34(2) Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 405; Tina Minkowitz, ‘Why Mental Health Laws Contravene the 
CRPD–An Application of Article 14 with Implications for the Obligations of States Parties’ (2011) SSRN 
Working Paper Series, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928600> 
(last accessed 25 June 2016); Arlene S. Kanter, The Development of Disability Rights under 
International Law: From Charity to Human Rights (Routledge, 2014). 
39 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at [48]. 
40 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines on Article 14 (adopted 
September 2015), available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GC/GuidelinesArticle14.doc> (last accessed 20 
January 2016). 
41 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report 
of Australia, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session (2-13 September 2013) CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1 
at para 32(c). 
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constitutes arbitrary deprivation of liberty and violates articles 12 and 14 of the 
Convention.”42 Further, this General Comment makes clear that functional 
assessments of mental capacity cannot be used as justifications for denials of legal 
capacity which discriminate in purpose or effect against persons with disabilities.43 
This means that the authorization of deprivation of liberty on the grounds that the 
person lacks mental capacity to consent to a particular living arrangement or medical 
treatment is prohibited under Article 12 CRPD. Such an interpretation has been 
critiqued by those in favour of involuntary detention and treatment,44 but has been 
warmly welcomed by many disabled people’s organisations,45 scholars actively 
involved in the drafting of the CRPD,46 and is also echoed by the UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention.47 
 
The most recent expression of the Committee’s interpretation of Article 14 is its 
guidelines, published in September 2015. While the guidelines do not have the status 
of a General Comment,48 they nonetheless represent the most up to date interpretation 
of Article 14 and give context for how the Committee will address States which come 
before it. These guidelines make clear that the Committee understands Article 14 to 
                                                          
42 CRPD/C/GC/1, para 36. 
43 Ibid, paras 12 and 13. 
44 See for example Melvyn Colin Freeman et al, ‘Reversing hard-won victories in the name of human 
rights: a critique of the General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ (2015) 2(9) Lancet Psychiatry 844; John Dawson, ‘A realistic approach to assessing 
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include an absolute prohibition of detention on the basis of ‘perceived or actual 
impairment.’ The Committee’s guidelines also go further than previous interpretations 
of Article 14, for example, that put forward by the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, who had suggested in 2009 that it would be in conformity with the CRPD to 
have disability-neutral laws on preventative detention.49 Bartlett interprets the High 
Commissioner’s perspective to mean that the use of ‘dangerousness’ or some other 
facially neutral criteria for preventative detention might be permissible under CRPD.50 
However, the Committee has now moved away from talking about disability-neutral 
criteria for detention in its Guidelines on Article 14. Instead, it states that “[t]he 
involuntary detention of persons with disabilities based on risk or dangerousness, 
alleged need of care or treatment or other reasons tied to impairment or health 
diagnosis is contrary to the right to liberty, and amounts to arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty.”51  
 
However, this perspective is not shared by all UN human rights treaty bodies. The 
Human Rights Committee published General Comment 35 just a few months before 
the CRPD Committee’s Guidelines on Article 14. In this general comment, the Human 
Rights Committee states that “The existence of a disability shall not in itself justify a 
deprivation of liberty but rather any deprivation of liberty must be necessary and 
proportionate, for the purpose of protecting the individual in question from serious 
harm or preventing injury to others. It must be applied only as a measure of last resort 
and for the shortest appropriate period of time, and must be accompanied by adequate 
procedural and substantive safeguards established by law.”52  
 
This position is in direct conflict with the CRPD, but appears closer to the position of 
the ECHR. However, the Human Rights Committee’s approach also conflicts with 
more recent developments in the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which 
revised its Basic Principles in May 2015. This document references “the State’s 
obligation to prohibit involuntary committal or internment on the ground of the 
existence of an impairment or perceived impairment, particularly on the basis of 
psychosocial or intellectual disability or perceived psychosocial or intellectual 
disability, as well as [the] obligation to design and implement de-institutionalization 
strategies based on the human rights model of disability.”53 Therefore, while there is a 
discrepancy between the interpretations of the universal right to liberty at the 
international level, it is clear that the two most recent expressions of this right as 
applied to disabled people – by the CRPD Committee and the Working Group on 
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IV. LIFE VS LIBERTY – A FALSE HIERARCHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
 
Many different justifications for deprivation of liberty in order to protect other human 
rights are offered by those in favour of maintaining disability-specific deprivations of 
liberty. Typically, these arguments centre on the notion that the detention is necessary 
in the ‘best interests’ of the person and is defensible from a human rights perspective 
if it is done with the goal of protecting the individual’s right to life or health, or the right 
to life of others.54 Those who support detention on the basis of the right to health argue 
the necessity of detention to provide needed but unwanted care and treatment, to 
restore the person’s capacity to take autonomous decisions, to protect the person from 
self-harm or from exploitation and abuse by others. However, I do not find these 
justifications for detention particularly convincing, given the significant body of 
literature which establishes that where a person is engaging or at risk of self-harm, 
care and support can be provided by non-coercive means, even in situations of acute 
crisis and distress.55  
 
In cases of harm to others, along with Minkowitz,56 Kanter,57 O’Mahony and Gooding58 
I support the proposition that these should be addressed through the criminal justice 
system, with the appropriate reasonable accommodations and support to enable the 
person to effectively participate in the process. Where the person is exposed to, or at 
risk of harm from others who seek to abuse or exploit her, I contend that it is a 
disproportionate response to deprive the victim of abuse of her liberty, and that 
instead, responses should focus on the perpetrator of abuse.59 Given these findings, 
the purported justification of deprivation of liberty that appears to hold the most 
legitimacy to me concerns the right to life. Some scholars have argued that at a 
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European level, Article 2 ECHR imposes a substantive obligation on States to initiate 
a deprivation of liberty if necessary to protect the right to life of the person or others.60 
In this sense, a jurisprudence of a ‘hierarchy of rights’ is often referred to, with the right 
to life trumping the right to liberty. I will now explore this claim in more detail with 
reference to ECHR case law. 
 
It is important at the outset of this analysis to clearly distinguish between state 
obligations to protect the right to life of those at risk of suicide, and those at risk of 
being killed by others. Two ECtHR cases to date have dealt with a threat to life posed 
by private individuals (one of which involved a diagnosis of mental illness), and three 
have dealt with the risk to life posed by suicide. I will first address the cases involving 
risk to life by third parties and then turn to the risk to life posed by suicide. It was 
established in Osman v UK61 that the right to life in Article 2 ECHR includes a positive 
obligation on States ‘to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within 
their jurisdiction.’ This obligation on the authorities is of a general nature, however it 
becomes a more specific and operational obligation where ‘the authorities knew or 
ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the 
life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and 
that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’62  
 
In this case, a teacher, Mr. Paget-Lewis had shot and killed Mr. Ali Osman (whose 
son, Ahmed was also wounded in the shooting). Mr. Paget-Lewis had been suspended 
from work following a psychiatric evaluation at the time of the shooting. However, the 
Court found that in this case that the applicants had failed to show that the authorities 
knew or ought to have known that the lives of Mr. Osman and his son were at real and 
immediate risk from the teacher. Therefore, the Court found that there was no violation 
of Article 2 by the UK. This is an important ruling as the Court did not suggest here 
that the authorities should have involuntarily detained or forcibly treated Mr. Paget-
Lewis in order to prevent the killing of Mr. Osman. In particular, the steps taken by the 
school authorities, including informing the police of their concerns about Mr. Paget-
Lewis and suspending him from teaching duties pending an investigation into alleged 
unprofessional behaviour with Ahmed Osman, were found by the Court to be 
proportionate to protect the right to life in Article 2 ECHR. 
 
However, in Kayak v Turkey,63 the Court found that the authorities had failed to protect 
the right to life of a 15 year old who was stabbed to death in the playground of the 
boarding school he attended. The attack was carried out by another student who was 
18 years old at the time, using a bread knife stolen from the school canteen. In this 
case, the Court held that the authorities had failed in their duty to ensure supervision 
of the school premises. Supervision of the premises was deemed by the court to be 
an operational obligation which was a proportionate response to the risk of danger 
posed to students. The Court reiterated that school authorities had an essential role 
to play in the protection of the health and well-being of pupils – having regard to their 
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particular vulnerability due to their age – and a primary duty to protect them against 
any form of violence to which they might be subjected while under the school’s 
supervision. While the school staff could not be expected to watch each pupil all the 
time, movements inside and outside the school required heightened surveillance. One 
of the distinguishing features of this case compared to Osman v UK is that the killing 
happened on school property, as opposed to at the applicants’ home. Therefore, in 
cases where persons with psychosocial disabilities pose a risk to the lives of others, 
the Court has not required preventive detention or forced treatment to be used, but 
has rather required States to take appropriate steps to protect potential victims where 
a threat to their lives is, or should be, known to the relevant authorities. 
 
I now turn to consider the ECHR cases involving a threat to life from suicide. In 
Reynolds v UK,64 the Court found that the National Health Service had failed in its 
operational duty to protect David Reynolds’ right to life. He had reported hearing voices 
telling him to kill himself and was admitted to hospital as a voluntary patient. The staff 
reported that he seemed calmer a few hours after his admission and was assessed as 
a low suicide risk. At one point during the evening he was found walking outside the 
unit and encouraged by staff to come back inside, which he did. Later that evening he 
broke the glass and jumped out of the window in his room on the sixth floor and 
subsequently died. The applicant, his mother, successfully argued that the National 
Health Service had violated her son’s right to life under Article 2 ECHR, as they were 
aware of the risk to his life by suicide and did not take appropriate steps to respond to 
that risk.  
 
However, while the Court recognised that a violation had occurred, it did not provide 
further detail in this case about what kinds of steps should have been taken by the 
authorities to preserve Mr. Reynolds’ right to life. It must be emphasised that the Court 
did not suggest that Mr. Reynolds should have been involuntarily detained or treated 
against his will in order to preserve his life. Further, the Court did not draw a link 
between David Reynolds’ right to life under Article 2 and his right to liberty under Article 
5 or suggest that one right took priority over the other. The applicant had not raised 
the question of whether Mr. Reynolds’ rights to liberty were violated while he was a 
voluntary patient; therefore, the Court did not comment on this issue.  
 
A violation of the right to life in Article 2 was also found in another case involving a 
hospital death, Arskaya v Ukraine. In this case, a 42 year old man died after refusing 
surgical intervention for a lung condition. The man, S, had refused surgery as he was 
‘in fear for his life’ and was described by clinicians as euphoric and emotionally 
unstable during the 11 days he spent in the hospital from his initial admission until his 
death. The Court held that Article 2 “obliges the national authorities to prevent an 
individual from taking his or her own life if the decision has not been taken freely and 
with full understanding of what is involved … It follows that one of the central issues in 
determining the validity of a refusal to undergo medical treatment by a patient is the 
issue of his or her decision-making capacity.”65  
 
Essentially, this decision implies that S’s treatment refusal should not have been 
respected, and that his legal capacity to consent to treatment should have been 
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removed and vested in a third party, such as a guardian. However, S was not 
attempting or requesting to leave the hospital, and did consent to less intrusive medical 
treatment, but consistently refused surgery. The Court did not consider whether his 
right to liberty had been infringed in this case. Nevertheless, if the hospital staff had 
refused to respect S’s treatment decision regarding the bronchoscopy, as the Court 
found they should have done, and forced him to undergo treatment against his will in 
order to save his life, this would inevitably involve a restriction of his right to liberty, at 
a minimum, during the surgery. In this sense, the Court has implied, without 
specifically referring to Article 5, that the right to life supersedes other human rights, 
including the rights to liberty and autonomy, in situations where the person’s life is at 
risk due to a physical illness and he or she is deemed to lack the decision-making 
capacity to provide informed consent or refusal of treatment. 
 
In Keenan v UK, the Court also found that the State has a particular operational duty 
to protect the right to life of prisoners whose confinement places them at greater risk 
to their life, including the risk of suicide. Mark Keenan had assaulted two prison guards 
after a change in psychiatric medication which he said made him feel unwell. As 
punishment for the assault, he was placed in solitary confinement, where he hanged 
himself. Nevertheless, the Court found that in this case, the State had upheld its 
operational duty under Article 2 since “on the whole, the authorities responded in a 
reasonable way to Mark Keenan’s conduct, placing him in hospital care and under 
watch when he evinced suicidal tendencies.”66 While this decision was made in the 
context of a prison environment, it can also be interpreted to provide guidance to other 
national authorities, including healthcare professionals, on reasonable steps to be 
taken where there is a real and identified risk to life by suicide.  
 
Since in this case, the detention followed a criminal conviction and had occurred in 
accordance with the law, no separate consideration was made of whether the 
applicant’s placement in a cell on the prison’s punishment block violated his right to 
liberty under Article 5 ECHR. However, the Court did find that the way in which Mark 
Keenan had been treated by prison staff did amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and recognised a violation of his rights under Article 3 
ECHR. In particular, it is worth noting here that the Court also stated that “there are 
general measures and precautions which will be available to diminish the opportunities 
for self-harm, without infringing on personal autonomy”67 and that it would need to be 
determined on a case by case basis whether other, more restrictive measures should 
be taken. This implies that approaches which respect autonomy must be taken first, 
before the national authorities can resort to any more coercive measures which might 
violate other rights protected by the ECHR, including the right to privacy in Article 8. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that the European Court has clearly stated that the right to life 
in Article 2 does not imply a corresponding right to choose to end one’s life, or to avail 
of assisted suicide. In Pretty v UK, the court held that no such right could be found in 
Article 2, 3 or 8 of the ECHR.68 However, it also held that the legalisation of assisted 
suicide in a State Party to the Convention would not necessarily violate the operational 
duty to respect the right to life in Article 2.69 It is significant that the Court has found 
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that in specific situations where a person’s life is at risk from his own actions or the 
actions of others, the State has an obligation to intervene to protect life, in a manner 
that might compromise the other human rights protected under the Convention. At this 
point, it is worth considering how these distinct international obligations – under the 
CRPD and ECHR have been interpreted in domestic case law in England to date, with 
a view to providing recommendations for reform.  
 
V. UK INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS  
ON THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND LIBERTY 
 
The UK’s approach to protecting the rights to life and liberty of persons with disabilities 
is more heavily reliant on the ECHR than on the CRPD, as disability-specific 
deprivations of liberty are still permitted through various legislative frameworks, 
primarily – in England and Wales – the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005.70 Before exploring the implications of these Acts in terms of human 
rights compliance and their interpretation in case law, it is worth briefly setting out the 
UK’s position on domestic incorporation of human rights norms. As noted above, the 
ECHR has a particularly high status in the hierarchy of laws, being incorporated into 
domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998. This legislation places an obligation 
on all public bodies (including providers of health and social care services) to comply 
with the ECHR in carrying out their functions. The 1998 Act also ensures that individual 
litigants can allege a violation of human rights protected in the ECHR in domestic 
courts, and that courts are empowered to make findings about the compatibility of 
domestic legislation with the ECHR.  
 
The UK ratified the CRPD in 2009 and did not enter any interpretative declarations or 
reservations with respect to Article 14 on the right to liberty. However, in its Initial 
Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the government 
maintains that “No one in the UK can be deprived of his or her liberty because he or 
she is disabled. If there are situations when it is necessary to detain a person who has 
a mental disorder, strict safeguards are in place to ensure that the needs of the 
individual are taken into account and respected.”71 The report then goes on to describe 
the various legal frameworks for civil commitment in the mental health system, the 
deprivation of liberty safeguards system in the Mental Capacity Act and the detention 
of offenders in the criminal justice system. This report fails to make the link between 
the CRPD requirement that disability shall ‘in no case’ be even one of the grounds for 
deprivation of liberty with the existing domestic legislation permitting deprivation of 
people with learning disabilities, mental health experience, dementia and other 
cognitive disabilities in the UK. 
 
As is the case in most countries, legislation in England and Wales provides for the 
deprivation of liberty of persons with disabilities for the purpose of involuntary 
psychiatric treatment in the Mental Health Act 1983, and in situations where the person 
concerned is unable to consent to their living arrangement or medical treatment under 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Mental Health Act 1983 allows for deprivation of 
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liberty for involuntary psychiatric treatment in hospital where a person is deemed to 
have a ‘mental disorder’ – i.e. a ‘disorder or disability of the mind.’72 This term can 
include persons with learning disabilities where ‘that disability is associated with 
abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct.’73 In addition to the 
existence of a mental disorder, the person can only be admitted for involuntary 
treatment under the Mental Health Act where ‘it is necessary for the health and safety 
of the patient or for the protection of other persons that he should receive such 
treatment and it cannot be provided unless he is detained under this section and 
appropriate medical treatment is available for him.’74 This provision was extended in 
the Mental Health Act 2007 to allow for compulsory treatment orders to be used 
outside a hospital setting in the community, a development which has been subject to 
significant critique by a number of commentators for its negative impact on the rights 
and freedoms of service users.75  
 
In 2009, the Mental Capacity Act was amended to introduce legislative safeguards for 
disability-specific deprivations of liberty as a result of the HL v UK76 decision from the 
European Court of Human Rights. This judgment found that there was a gap in the 
legal framework for voluntary patients in the mental health system who, like HL, are 
not in fact free to leave, and had not provided valid consent to their confinement. In 
this case, the European Court found that HL ‘lacked capacity’ to consent to his 
detention and treatment. In response, the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards were 
introduced to give a legislative basis to ensure that all health and social care providers 
obtain authorisation for any deprivation of liberty proposed for adults who ‘lacked 
capacity.’ The safeguards provide that such deprivations must only be used for 
individuals who by reason of an impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of the 
mind or brain, fail to pass a functional assessment of mental capacity.77 In addition, 
the deprivation of liberty must be in the relevant person’s best interests, must be 
necessary to prevent harm to the person, and be proportionate to the likelihood and 
seriousness of that harm. The safeguards aim to ensure that deprivations of liberty are 
independently authorised by local authorities, only occur in approved settings such as 
hospitals and care homes, are regularly reviewed, and subject to legal challenge – 
including through the assistance of an independent mental capacity advocate.  
 
There is an extensive body of scholarly work on the effectiveness and human rights 
implications of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, which is impossible to capture 
in any depth in this present article. However, it is worth noting that the recent explosion 
of interest in this topic at a national level has stemmed from two domestic 
developments – an inquiry undertaken by the House of Lords on the Mental Capacity 
Act and the Supreme Court decision in Cheshire West.78 In particular, it is worth 
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highlighting that the House of Lords described the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
as ‘not fit for purpose’ and found that better implementation would not be sufficient to 
redress the fundamental problems identified.79 It recommended a comprehensive 
review of this aspect of the legislation incorporating widespread consultation and the 
provision of adequate time for parliamentary scrutiny. Work is currently underway at 
the Law Commission to review the legislation and develop recommendations for 
reform, described in further detail below.80  
 
In respect of Cheshire West, the most important aspect of the decision for the present 
argument was Baroness Hale’s ruling that the right to liberty must be a universal one81 
– and its content and related obligations should not therefore be varied for different 
population groups, such as persons with disabilities. This case involved three adults 
with learning disabilities who experienced various restrictions in their movements 
and/or would have been prevented from leaving the places where they lived (one 
litigant lived in adult foster care and the other two in care homes). The leading 
judgment written by Baroness Hale acknowledged that none of the litigants had made 
any efforts to leave, and that these placements were in their ‘best interests’ but 
nevertheless recognised that they were de facto deprived of their liberty under Article 
5 ECHR, although the deprivations were justified under Article 5(1)(e) and did not give 
rise to a violation of the individuals’ human rights.  
 
Baroness Hale cited the CRPD in support of her argument about the universal nature 
of human rights for persons with disabilities, and acknowledged that the ECHR should 
be read ‘in light of’ the CRPD, and has indeed already begun to influence Strasbourg 
jurisprudence since the decision of Glor v Switzerland.82 The positive developments in 
the ECHR jurisprudence which serve to align the court’s position closer to the CRPD 
in cases involving deprivation of liberty and denial of legal capacity have been noted 
by Lewis83 and Series,84 among others. While the court can clearly continue to develop 
its jurisprudence in this direction, it will inevitably confront the stumbling block that 
Article 5(1)(e) justifies disability-specific forms of deprivation of liberty, whereas Article 
14 CRPD does not, as discussed above. However, for states struggling to comply with 
both standards, as I argued above, moving away from the kind of detention permitted 
by the ECHR and towards the standard enshrined in the CRPD can certainly be 
undertaken, even where the CRPD is not directly applicable in domestic law. 
Justifications for moving away from the ECHR and towards the CRPD include the fact 
that the CRPD is the most recent expression of how international human rights norms 
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should apply to the lived experience of persons with disabilities,85 and that its drafting 
involved unprecedented levels of participation of persons with disabilities,86 including 
those with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, who are arguably best placed to 
determine how deprivations of liberty, even when undertaken in the name of 
protection, care and treatment, affect their enjoyment of all human rights. 
 
Much more can be read about domestic developments on deprivation of liberty in the 
UK in other articles within this volume, and in previous work by Stavert,87 Penny and 
Exworthy,88 and others. The ECHR dimensions of these developments have been 
explored in some detail – but the Cheshire West case does not raise questions of 
whether the right to liberty might be compromised in order to protect the right to life, 
or to protect other fundamental human rights, and so will not be discussed in further 
detail in this article. However, before considering further the case law on deprivation 
of liberty in England, it is worth briefly exploring the most up to date developments 
from the Law Commission’s work on reforming the Deprivation of Liberty safeguards. 
 
The Law Commission’s Consultation Paper published in 2015 proposed the 
replacement of the existing Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards scheme with a new 
tiered system of ‘protective care.’89 This comprised of ‘supportive care’ for persons 
deemed to lack mental capacity to decide where to live but whose living arrangement 
did not amount to a deprivation of liberty; ‘restrictive care’ for those who lacked 
capacity and whose living arrangement did involve a deprivation of liberty, and a 
separate scheme for deprivation of liberty in hospitals and palliative care.90 However, 
in May 2016, the Commission published an interim statement following receipt of 
submissions to its consultation process, indicating a shift away from this approach 
towards a more streamlined scheme for authorizing deprivations of liberty. According 
to this statement the Law Commission’s revised proposals will only cover restrictive 
care and treatment and not include a separate hospital scheme. The Commission’s 
interim statement proposes that “[t]he responsibility for establishing the case for a 
deprivation of liberty will be shifted onto the commissioning body (such as the NHS or 
local authority) that is arranging the relevant care or treatment, and away from the care 
provider. … The required evidence would include a capacity assessment and objective 
medical evidence of the need for a deprivation of liberty on account of the person’s 
mental health condition.”91  
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This seems to suggest that deprivation of liberty will, under the new proposal, only be 
authorised based on the person’s ‘mental health condition’ and not on other criteria 
such as the person’s ‘best interests’. However, the existing scheme operates under 
the Mental Capacity Act, which uses ‘best interests’ as the test by which decisions are 
made on behalf of a person who is deemed to lack capacity, and the Commission’s 
suggestion that the process of depriving a person of liberty include a capacity 
assessment seems to indicate that ‘best interests’ standards will still play a role in this 
process. The use of the language ‘mental health condition’ in this proposal is 
suggestive of ‘mental disorder’ – the existing standard under the Mental Health Act, 
which includes both a diagnosis of mental illness and risk of harm to self or others. 
This proposal is not entirely clear in its current formulation – but seems to indicate a 
fusion of the approaches in existing capacity legislation with the regulation of 
involuntary detention under the Mental Health Act. 
 
Further, the Commission states that since it will abandon its previous proposal for a 
separate hospital scheme, “there should be no additional mechanism inserted into the 
Mental Health Act to cater for compliant incapacitated patients.”92 This term covers 
those who, like HL in the Bournewood case, are admitted to psychiatric hospital 
without objecting, but who are deemed incapable of providing informed consent. The 
Commission notes that “if such patients are to be admitted to hospital (general or 
psychiatric) for purposes of assessment and treatment for mental disorder, their 
admission should be on the basis of the existing powers of the Mental Health Act.”93 
This seems to suggest that patients who cannot provide informed consent to treatment 
must be treated as involuntary patients under the Mental Health Act, regardless of 
whether or not they object to their detention and/or treatment. While further clarification 
will be provided when the Law Commission publishes its final recommendations and 
draft bill in December 2016, it appears that the position in domestic law will continue 
to authorise deprivations of liberty for persons with disabilities based either on a 
diagnosis of mental illness or disability or determination of lack of mental capacity, 
consistent with ECHR jurisprudence but in contrast to the requirements of Article 14 
CRPD. 
 
I will now turn to two important domestic cases where the House of Lords and Supreme 
Court, respectively, considered whether a deprivation of liberty should have occurred 
in order to preserve an individual’s right to life, in accordance with the provisions of the 
ECHR. In the first case,94 Carol Savage had been detained under the Mental Health 
Act 1983. After three months of detention, she left the hospital without permission and 
walked to a nearby train station where she jumped in front of a train and was killed. 
Her daughter sued the NHS trust which managed the hospital under the Human Rights 
Act for failure to protect her mother’s right to life under Article 2 ECHR. The Trust 
appealed to the House of Lords, arguing that Article 2 obligations should not apply to 
its staff in this case. However, the House of Lords dismissed this appeal, finding that 
the health service does have an operational duty under Article 2 ECHR to protect the 
lives of patients detained under the Mental Health Act. The judgment set out that the 
operational obligation arose only if members of staff knew or ought to have known that 
a particular patient presented a “real and immediate” risk of suicide. In those 
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circumstances Article 2 ECHR required them to do all that could reasonably be 
expected to prevent the patient from committing suicide. This decision was partly 
based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of the 
duties on prison staff to take steps to prevent prisoners from committing suicide.95 If 
the hospital staff in this case were found to have failed to take reasonable steps, not 
only would they and the health authorities be liable in negligence, but the House of 
Lords held that there would be a violation of the operational obligation under Article 2 
ECHR to protect the patient’ right to life.  
 
The question of whether the hospital staff knew or ought to have known of an 
immediate risk to Carol Savage’s life, and whether they took all reasonable steps to 
prevent it, was referred back to the trial judge in the High Court. In this subsequent 
decision, Mackay J found that there was a real and immediate risk to Carol Savage’s 
life, and that the staff had failed to take reasonable steps to prevent her from 
committing suicide, stating “all that was required to give her a real prospect or 
substantial chance of survival was the imposition of a raised level of observations, 
which would not have been an unreasonable or unduly onerous step to require of the 
defendant in the light of the evidence in this case.”96 However, it is interesting to note 
that in the earlier House of Lords judgment on this case, Lord Rodger commented that 
“Runwell Hospital could have kept Mrs Savage in a locked ward, instead of an open 
acute ward, could have subjected her to checks on her whereabouts every 15 minutes 
instead of the 30 minute checks that were prescribed at the time of her fatal 
absconding on 5 July 2004, and, no doubt, could have imposed other restrictions that 
would have made it virtually impossible for her to abscond. However the hospital were, 
in my opinion, entitled, and perhaps bound, to allow Mrs Savage a degree of 
unsupervised freedom that did carry with it some risk that she might succeed in 
absconding. They were entitled to place a value on her quality of life in the Hospital 
and accord a degree of respect to her personal autonomy above that to which 
prisoners in custody could expect.”97 In this case, Mrs. Savage had already been 
deprived of her liberty in a manner permitted by Article 5(1)(e) ECHR, but the trial 
judge’s ruling suggests that further restrictions on her liberty, in the form of more 
frequent observations, should have been imposed as a result of the real and 
immediate risk to her life. 
 
In the second case, Melanie Rabone,98 a voluntary patient, committed suicide during 
a period of leave from hospital. She was admitted to hospital as an emergency 
following a suicide attempt and was assessed by the hospital as at high risk of a further 
suicide attempt. Although she was admitted as a voluntary patient she was informed 
that if she attempted or demanded to leave, she would be reassessed for involuntary 
detention under the Mental Health Act. After three weeks in hospital, she expressed a 
strong desire to be allowed home for a weekend visit. Her parents were concerned 
about whether she was well enough to return home, but her consultant agreed to two 
days leave. On the afternoon of the second day, Melanie told her mother that she was 
going to visit a friend, and hanged herself in a nearby park. Lord Dyson JSC held that 
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there was a real and immediate risk to her life by suicide and that the hospital staff 
had failed to take reasonable steps to uphold their operational duty to protect her life. 
In this context, the House of Lords found that making Melanie an involuntary patient 
would have been a reasonable step to protect her right to life, stating “if she had 
insisted on leaving the hospital, the authorities could and should have exercised their 
powers under the [Mental Health Act] to prevent her from doing so”.99 Lord Dyson JSC 
further held that “the decision to allow Melanie two days home leave was one that no 
reasonable psychiatric practitioner would have made.”100 
 
This case sets a troubling precedent in domestic jurisprudence – and has been 
interpreted by Callaghan, Ryan and Kerridge to mean that people with mental illness 
should be pre-emptively detained as a means of suicide prevention.101 These authors 
suggest that one approach to this problem would be to only detain psychiatric patients 
who lack the mental capacity to make a decision to leave; in keeping with the European 
Court decision in Arskaya.102 However, at present, a lack of mental capacity is not a 
basis for detention or involuntary treatment under the Mental Health Act in England 
and Wales, although legislation to introduce a mental capacity-based system of 
detention and treatment has been enacted in Northern Ireland.103 A lack of mental 
capacity is however one of the conditions for detention in accordance with the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards under the Mental Capacity Act (England and 
Wales). In my view, none of these approaches are sufficient to protect the totality of 
the individual’s human rights, either under the ECHR or the CRPD, and further efforts 
must be made to bring domestic law into compliance with international human rights 
standards, as I explore in the following section.  
 
VI. TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS-COMPLIANT SOLUTION 
 AT DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN LEVELS 
 
As I have argued above, deprivation of liberty on the basis of a determination of either 
‘unsound mind’ or lack of mental capacity is highly subjective and value-laden, and 
should therefore fall foul, in my view, of the requirement in both the ECHR and 
international human rights law that deprivations of liberty must not be arbitrary. 
Significant empirical research evidence shows that functional assessments of mental 
capacity are just as subjective and value laden as determinations of risk of harm to 
self or others.104 While there are scholars who disagree with these findings, and argue 
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that there is an increasing coherence in the methods and findings of functional 
assessments of mental capacity,105 the critique of these approaches by critical 
psychiatrists,106 users and survivors of psychiatry,107 disabled people’s 
organisations108 and human rights scholars109 serves as a basis for challenging this 
perspective. 
 
The criteria of risk of harm forms the current basis for decisions to detain patients 
under the Mental Health Act 1983, and this approach has been criticised by Callaghan, 
Ryan, and Kerridge for its vagueness and the difficulty in determining the extent of risk 
that should warrant detention.110 Further, as these authors acknowledge, deprivations 
of liberty are not guaranteed to be effective in suicide prevention. The literature also 
demonstrates that less invasive responses to the risk of suicide can be far more 
effective than approaches involving force or coercion.111 These alternatives are often 
trauma-based approaches, many of which have been developed by the people with 
                                                          
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2013) 41(1) The Journal of Law, Medicine 
& Ethics 48. 
105 See for example Ruth Cairns et al., ‘Reliability of mental capacity assessments in psychiatric in-
patients’ (2005) 187(4) The British Journal of Psychiatry 372; Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum 
and Thomas Grisso, ‘Constructing competence: formulating standards of legal competence to make 
medical decisions’ (1996) 156(9) American Journal of Psychiatry 345; Thomas Grisso and Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Assessing competence to consent to treatment: A guide for physicians and other health 
professionals (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
106 See for example Peter Kinderman, ‘Mental health law and incapacity: The role of the Clinical 
Psychologist’ (2002) Journal of Mental Health Law 179; Joanna Moncrieff, ‘“Freedom is more important 
than health”: Thomas Szasz and the problem of paternalism’ (2014) 11(2) International Psychiatry 46; 
Bruce J. Winick, ‘The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health’ 
(1995) 1 Journal of Psychiatry, Public Policy and Law 42. 
107 See for example World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry and Center for Human Rights 
of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, Response to Draft General Comment on Article 12 (New York, 
2014) available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx> (last 
accessed 30 June 2016). 
108 See for example, People with Disabilities Australia, the Australian Centre for Disability Law and the 
Australian Human Rights Centre, Submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission: Equality, 
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws (Sydney, July 2014), available at: 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/136._org_people_with_disability_australia_pwda__th
e_australian_centre_for_disability_law_acdl_and_australian_human_rights_centre_.pdf> (last 
accessed 1 July 2016); Sociedad y Discapacidad, Submission to the CRPD Committee on the Draft 
General Comment on Article 12 (Lima, 2014), available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx> (last accessed 1 July 
2016). 
109 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 – Article 12: 
Equal Recognition Before the Law, UN Doc. No. CRPD/C/GC/1, adopted at the 11th Session (April 
2014); UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines on Article 14 (adopted 
September 2015), available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GC/GuidelinesArticle14.doc> (last accessed 20 
January 2016); UN General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: United 
Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right of anyone deprived of their liberty to bring 
proceedings before a court (New York, 4 May 2015) WGAD/CRP.1/2015. 
110 Sascha Callaghan, Christopher Ryan and Ian Kerridge, ‘Risk of suicide is insufficient warrant for 
coercive treatment for mental illness’ (2013) 36(5) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 374. 
111 See for example Shery Mead and Mary Ellen Copeland, ‘What recovery means to us: Consumers' 
perspectives’ (2000) 36(3) Community mental health journal 315; Shery Mead, David Hilton and Laurie 
Curtis, ‘Peer support: a theoretical perspective’ (2001) 25(2) Psychiatric rehabilitation journal 134; 
Douglas Noordsy, William Torrey, Kim Mueser, Shery Mead, Chris O'Keefe and Lindy Fox, ‘Recovery 
from severe mental illness: an intrapersonal and functional outcome definition’ (2002) 14(4) 
International Review of Psychiatry 318. 
[2016] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
97 
 
lived experience of emotional distress within the user and survivor movement.112 For 
example, Muskett’s review of the global literature on trauma-informed care in mental 
health demonstrates that hospitals and services which used these approaches – 
including de-escalating crisis situations with peer support, counselling, and talking 
therapies which acknowledge the person’s distress without medicalising the 
experience, reported a marked decrease in the use of coercive practices such as 
restraint, seclusion and involuntary admission.113 There is also significant evidence on 
the effectiveness of non-coercive practices for people experiencing extreme distress, 
self-harm, challenging behaviour and mental health crisis through methods such as 
family group conferencing,114 the use of personal ombuds,115 circles of support116 and 
open dialogue,117 which have been written about extensively in the literature on Article 
12 CRPD.118 
 
Given the decision in Rabone, the findings of the Law Commission and the current 
implementation of the Mental Capacity Act, it is unlikely that the domestic legal 
framework in England and Wales will move away from disability-specific deprivation 
of liberty in the near future. However, it is possible that the case law could develop in 
a more progressive direction, if the courts begin to recognise that less restrictive 
alternatives to detention are more proportionate and effective responses to the risk to 
life posed by suicide than a deprivation of liberty and imposition of non-consensual 
treatment. When specifying the kinds of measures that should have been taken by 
state actors, including health professionals, to fulfil their operational obligation to 
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protect the right to life, domestic courts could for example refer to the need for access 
to crisis peer support in the community. Courts could also require healthcare 
professionals to demonstrate that alternatives to coercion such as family group 
conferencing and open dialogue were attempted in order to protect the person’s right 
to life while also respecting the individual’s right to healthcare based on informed 
consent, and the right to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others, as set out 
in Articles 25 and 12 of the CRPD. 
 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the European Court has not explicitly followed 
the approach of the UK Supreme Court in Rabone. While the European Court has 
established in Arskaya that refusal of medical treatment should not be respected 
unless the patient had the necessary decision-making capacity, this decision was 
reached in a case concerning medical treatment for a physical health condition, not 
forced psychiatric treatment, and in Rabone, the decision to grant home leave was not 
connected to an assessment of the patient’s decision-making capacity. In Reynolds, 
the European Court had the opportunity to consider whether a voluntary patient in the 
mental health system should have been detained in order to protect his right to life. 
The applicant in Reynolds referenced the Rabone decision in his submission, which 
meant that it was open to the European Court to follow this line of reasoning, and to 
suggest what kinds of measures (including detention) would have been reasonable for 
the hospital staff to take in order to fulfil the operational obligation under Article 2.  
 
The European Court did not suggest that Reynolds should have been detained in 
these circumstances, although it did find that a violation of the operational duty to 
protect the right to life had occurred. However, the Court has in previous cases outlined 
what measures should be taken in respect of prisoners who are at risk of suicide as 
discussed above119 and so would have been at liberty to reiterate those here or 
develop new guidelines on necessary measures. Therefore the Court’s decision to 
remain silent on this matter in Reynolds can be interpreted as a deliberate one. The 
reluctance of the Court to specify what might constitute reasonable steps in these 
situations may also be attributable in part to its remit as an international court, and the 
judges may well have felt that domestic authorities are better positioned to determine 
what reasonable measures would be.  
 
While the European Court cannot ignore Article 5(1)(e) and cannot therefore find a de 
facto violation of Convention rights where individuals have been lawfully involuntarily 
detained under mental health or mental capacity laws, it can state whether a 
deprivation of liberty is a proportionate response to a real and immediate risk to life by 
suicide. To date, it has not made such a statement, even where invited to do so in 
Reynolds v UK. As suggested above in respect of the domestic courts in England, it 
would also be encouraging to see the European Court’s jurisprudence include more 
references to the alternative, peer-driven community-based supports for emotional 
distress, crisis and suicide prevention, as examples of less restrictive measures which 
can be undertaken in order to respect the operational obligation to protect the right to 
life. Such an approach would be in keeping with the Court’s statement in Keenan v UK 
that the first response of state authorities should be to take precautions to diminish 
self-harm which do not infringe on personal autonomy.  
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This would align with the Court’s jurisprudence on institutionalisation of persons with 
intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, such as its decision in Stanev v Bulgaria120 
that the imposition of partial guardianship on the applicant and his subsequent 
placement in a social care home violated his right to liberty under Article 5. In that 
decision, the Court held that “the objective need for accommodation and social 
assistance must not automatically lead to the imposition of measures involving 
deprivation of liberty.”121 It follows therefore that less restrictive measures, including 
appropriate community support, must be made available to persons with disabilities, 
to replace the current system of disability-specific deprivations of liberty, justified on 
the basis of the perceived need for care and protection of the person. The Court is 
prepared to accept in these cases that support and care can be provided in a manner 
that does not infringe the rights to autonomy, privacy and liberty protected in the 
ECHR. Further elaboration on the kinds of proportionate measures to be taken in 
response to a crisis would be most welcome as the Court’s jurisprudence in this field 





There has been an increasing tendency for the European Court to cite the CRPD in 
its jurisprudence since its decision in Glor v Switzerland,122 as discussed above. In 
order to bring the ECHR case law closer to CRPD compliance, it is open to the Court 
to find that a deprivation of liberty imposed because the person has been deemed to 
be of ‘unsound mind’, constitutes arbitrary detention, although given the trajectory of 
the Court’s case law to date, such a move seems unlikely in the near future. Perhaps 
a more likely outcome would be for the court to find that a particular deprivation of 
liberty, while lawful under Article 5, constitutes a breach of the Article 8 right to privacy 
and respect for home and family life.  
 
In my view, there is still potential for both the ECtHR and domestic courts in the UK to 
find disability-specific deprivations of liberty in violation of Article 8 and 14 ECHR, even 
where such provisions may be consistent with Article 5 ECHR. A specific deprivation 
of liberty may not amount to a violation of Article 5 but amount to an unjustified 
interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 and may also constitute disability-
based discrimination prohibited by Article 14. The Article 8 approach to disability-
specific forms of deprivation of liberty is particularly attractive where it can be 
demonstrated that less intrusive measures could have been used to provide care and 
support to the person – for example to continue living independently in the community 
with the social support and access to healthcare that the person might need.  
 
Restrictions on Article 8 rights are permitted where they are “in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
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for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.” However, research evidence demonstrates that a majority of mental health 
deprivations of liberty are based on ‘danger to self’ rather than ‘danger to others’123 
which means that the restrictions concerning public safety, prevention of crime, and 
protection of the rights of others, would not apply in such cases. Further, the Mental 
Capacity Act does not provide for deprivation of liberty to be undertaken on the basis 
of risk of harm to others – but only where such detention is in the person’s ‘best 
interests.’ This kind of deprivation of liberty could only then be justified on the basis of 
protection of the person’s health according to the ECHR. As I have argued above, 
where danger to others applies, the appropriate response in my view is to engage the 
criminal justice system for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, with 
the necessary reasonable accommodations to ensure effective participation in the 
justice system. In keeping with Szmukler, Daw, and Callard,124 I do not believe that a 
mere finding of ‘danger to others’ is an ethically acceptable ground for imposing pre-
emptive detention or forced treatment, although I also dispute their purported solution 
of a mental capacity assessment to determine whether or not forced treatment and 
detention should apply. 
 
As the evidence base on alternatives to coercion in mental health care continues to 
grow, courts may increasingly ask hard questions of healthcare providers about the 
necessity of coercion and forced treatment and its long-term outcomes for individuals 
– in terms of both their health and the protection of their human rights. This approach 
could certainly lead to a greater willingness on the part of the courts to recognise 
disability-specific detention and forced treatment as human rights violations, reading 
the ECHR in a manner more consistent with the CRPD. Such an approach can be 
substantiated by finding that disability-specific detention and forced treatment also 
constitute disability-based discrimination under Article 14 ECHR. The UK Supreme 
Court has already held in AM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions125 that 
inconsistency of domestic provisions with international law, including unincorporated 
treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the CRPD, can form 
part of the assessment of objective justification in determining whether discrimination 
has occurred contrary to Article 14 ECHR. Building on this ruling, it is possible to argue 
that there is further scope in domestic courts to rely on the CRPD in finding disability-
specific deprivations of liberty to constitute disability-based discrimination under Article 
14 ECHR.  
 
This approach could also be replicated in the European Court of Human Rights, where 
cases like Korbechev and Sergeyeva v Russia,126 Kiyutin v Russia127 and Glor v 
Switzerland128 demonstrate the court’s willingness to find disability-based 
discrimination to violate Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 where the discrimination 
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does not meet a proportionality test in pursuance of a legitimate aim. Such an 
approach would seem to be a natural extension of the court’s case law on adult 
guardianship and deprivation of liberty in psychiatric hospitals and care homes, which 
has emerged since the decision of Stanev v Bulgaria.129 It would also begin to address 
the Court’s stated intention to read the ECHR in light of prevailing international human 
rights standards which are accepted by States Parties to the Convention – almost all 
of which, including the UK, have also ratified the CRPD. Finally, this would begin to 
clarify how countries which have ratified both the ECHR and the CRPD could ensure 
compliance with both conventions, which fully respect the totality of rights of persons 
with disabilities, especially those with intellectual, psychosocial and cognitive 
disabilities who are more likely to experience violations of their right to liberty in the 
name of protection. 
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